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Abstract Botnets are the preeminent source of online
crime and arguably one of the greatest threats to the
Internet infrastructure. In this paper, we present Zom-
bieCoin, a botnet command-and-control (C&C) mech-
anism that leverages the Bitcoin network. ZombieCoin
offers considerable advantages over existing C&C tech-
niques, most notably the fact that Bitcoin is designed
to resist the very same takedown campaigns and reg-
ulatory processes that are the most often-used meth-
ods to combat botnets today. Furthermore, we describe
how the Bitcoin network enables novel C&C techniques,
which dramatically expand the scope of this threat, in-
cluding the possibilities of flexible rendezvous schedul-
ing, efficient botnet partitioning, and fine-grained con-
trol over bots.
We validate our claims by implementing ZombieCoin
bots which we then deploy and successfully control over
the Bitcoin network. Our findings lead us to believe that
Bitcoin-based C&C mechanisms are a highly desirable
option botmasters will pursue in the near future. We
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hope our study provides a useful first step towards de-
vising effective countermeasures for this threat.
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1 Introduction
Botnets are networks of compromised machines, indi-
vidually referred to as bots or zombies, controlled re-
motely by a malicious entity known as the botmaster.
They were originally developed as tools for vandalism
and to showcase hacking skills, and have evolved into
sophisticated platforms geared towards financial gain
and cyberwarfare. Almost eight years have passed since
Vint Cerf’s dire warning of a botnet “pandemic” [1],
and since then the threat has only intensified.
Large botnets today typically number millions of
infected victims, employed in a wide range of illicit ac-
tivity including spam and phishing campaigns, spying,
information theft and extortion [2]. The FBI recently
estimated that 500 million computers are infected annu-
ally, incurring global losses of approximately $110 bil-
lion [3]. Botnets have now started conscripting mobile
phones [4] and smart devices, such as refrigerators and
surveillance cameras to spam and mine cryptocurren-
cies [5]. There are even national security implications:
in the Estonian cyberattacks of 2007, botnets mounted
distributed denial of service (DDoS) campaigns, crip-
pling Estonian ICT infrastructure and forcing govern-
ment portals, media outlets, banks, and telcos to dis-
connect from the Internet [6]. These alarming develop-
ments have prompted US lawmakers to actively pursue
legislation to combat the botnet threat [7].
The fatal weak point for botnets is the C&C infras-
tructure which essentially functions as the central ner-
vous system of the botnet. Downstream communication
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comprises instructions and software updates sent by the
botmaster, whereas upstream communication from bots
includes loot, such as financial data, login credentials,
etc. Security researchers usually reverse engineer a bot,
infiltrate the C&C network, trace the botmaster and
disrupt the botnet. The overwhelming majority of suc-
cessful takedown operations to date have relied heavily
on exploiting or subverting botnet C&C infrastructures
[2].
In this paper, we argue that Bitcoin is an ideal C&C
dissemination mechanism for botnets. Bitcoin is a fully
functional decentralized cryptocurrency, the popular-
ity of which has skyrocketed in the wake of the global
financial crisis. 1 bitcoin (or BTC) trades at approxi-
mately $480 and the currency has a market cap of ap-
proximately $6.17 billion [8].1 Bitcoin trades over $257
million a day, which is a greater volume of transactions
than Western Union and this year some expect it to
overtake Paypal and American credit card networks in-
cluding Discover [9]. At the heart of Bitcoin’s success
is the blockchain, a massively distributed, cryptograph-
ically verifiable database, maintained over the Bitcoin
P2P network, which tracks currency ownership in near
real-time.
Bitcoin offers botmasters considerable advantages
over existing C&C techniques such as IRC chatrooms,
HTTP rendezvous points, or P2P networks. First, by
piggybacking communications onto the Bitcoin network,
the botmaster is spared the costly and hazardous pro-
cess of maintaining a custom C&C network. Second,
Bitcoin provides some degree of anonymity which may
be enhanced using conventional mechanisms like VPNs
or Tor. Third, Bitcoin has built-in mechanisms to har-
monize global state, eliminating the need for bot-to-bot
communication. Capture of one bot therefore does not
expose others, and an observer cannot enumerate the
size of the botnet.
Most importantly, C&C communications over the
Bitcoin network cannot be shut down simply by confis-
cating a few servers or poisoning routing tables. The
Bitcoin network is designed to withstand these very
kind of attacks. Furthermore, disrupting C&C commu-
nication would be difficult to do without seriously im-
pacting legitimate Bitcoin users and may break Bitcoin.
Any form of regulation would be a fragrant violation of
the libertarian ideology Bitcoin is built upon [10]. It
would also entail significant protocol modification on
the majority of Bitcoin clients scattered all over the
world.
We explore in detail the possibility of running a bot-
net over Bitcoin. Our specific contributions are:
1 Bitcoin prices are prone to fluctuation. All figures quoted
in this paper date to September, 2014.
1. We present ZombieCoin, a mechanism enabling bot-
masters to communicate with bots over the Bitcoin
network by embedding C&C communications in Bit-
coin transactions.
2. We describe how the Bitcoin paradigm enables novel
C&C possibilities including dynamic upstream chan-
nels, fine-grained control over bots, and efficient par-
titioning of the botnet.
3. We prototype and deploy ZombieCoin over the Bit-
coin network. Experimental results indicate that bot
response time is generally in the range of 5-12 sec-
onds.
4. We suggest possible countermeasures against such
botnets.
We have also chosen to make the ZombieCoin source
code available for purposes of academic research strictly.2
Our goal, of course, is not to empower criminal oper-
ations, but to evaluate this threat so that preemptive
solutions may be devised. This is in the spirit of exist-
ing research efforts exploring emergent threats (such as
cryptovirology [11] and the FORWARD initiative [12]).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 presents essential background information on bot-
nets and Bitcoin and motivates the rest of this paper.
Section 3 describes the ZombieCoin protocol in detail
and proposes enhancements for additional functional-
ity. Section 4 presents our prototype implementation
and experimental results. We discuss possible counter-
measures in Section 5, related work in Section 6, and
conclude in Section 7.
2 Background
We summarize here the evolutionary path of C&C mech-
anisms, followed by a brief overview of Bitcoin.
2.1 Botnet C&C Mechanisms
First generation botnets, such as Agobot, SDBot, and
SpyBot (observed in 2002-2003) [13], maintain C&C
communications over Internet Relay Chat (IRC)
networks. The botmaster hardcodes IRC server and
channel details into the bot executable prior to deploy-
ment, and, after infection, bots log on to the specified
chatroom for instructions. This method has numerous
advantages: the IRC protocol is widely used across the
Internet, there are several public servers which botnets
can use, and communication is in real-time. However,
2 Interested parties are requested to contact the authors via
email.
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the network signature of IRC traffic is easily distin-
guished. More critically, this C&C architecture is cen-
tralized. Researchers can reverse-engineer bots, allow-
ing them to eavesdrop in C&C chatrooms, identify the
bots and track the botmaster. Researchers also regu-
larly coordinate with law enforcement to legally take
down C&C chatrooms, crippling the entire botnet in
just one step. According to insider accounts, two thirds
of IRC botnets are shut down in just 24 hours [14].
The next generation of botnets upgraded toHTTP-
based C&C communications. Examples include Ru-
stock, Zeus and Asprox (observed in 2006-2008). Bots
periodically contact a webserver using HTTP messages
to receive instructions and offload loot. HTTP is ubiq-
uitous on most networks and bot communications blend
in with legitimate user traffic. However, web domains
can be blocked at the DNS level, C&C webservers can
be located and seized and the botmaster can be traced.
To adapt, botmasters came up with two major in-
novations. Bots are no longer hardcoded with a web
address prior to deployment, but with a Domain Gen-
eration Algorithm (DGA) that takes date and time
as seed values to generate custom domain names at a
rapid rate. The rationale is that it is very costly and
time-consuming for law enforcement to seize a large
number of domains whereas the botmaster has to reg-
ister only one to successfully rendezvous with his bots
in a given time-window. Conficker-C generated 50,000
domain names daily, distributed over 116 Top Level Do-
mains (TLDs) which proved nearly impossible to block
[15]. However, DGAs can be reverse-engineered. Secu-
rity researchers hijacked the Torpig botnet for a period
of ten days by registering certain domains ahead of the
botmasters [16].
The second innovation is Domain Flux: botmas-
ters now link several hundreds of destination IP ad-
dresses with a single fully qualified domain name in
a DNS record (e.g. www.domain.com). These IP ad-
dresses are swapped at high frequency (as often as ev-
ery 3 minutes), so that different parties connecting to
the same domain within minutes of each other are redi-
rected to different locations. Furthermore, destination
IP addresses often themselves point to infected hosts
which act as proxies for the botmaster. Yet another
layer of confusion can be added into the equation by
similarly concealing the Authoritative Name Servers for
the domain within this constantly changing fast flux
cloud.
The third major development in botnet C&C infras-
tructures is decentralized P2P networks which have
been used by Conficker, Nugache and Storm botnets
in 2006-2007. Bots maintain individual routing tables,
and every bot actively participates in routing data in
the network, making it difficult to identify C&C servers.
However, P2P-based bots also have weak points: for in-
stance, to bootstrap entry into the P2P network, Phat-
bot uses Gnutella cache servers on the Internet and
Nugache bots are hardcoded with a seed list of IP ad-
dresses, both of which are centralized points of failure
[17]. Security researchers have been able to detect P2P
traffic signatures, successfully crawl P2P networks to
enumerate the botnet, and poison bot routing tables
to disrupt the botnet. In a concerted takedown effort,
Symantec researchers took down the ZeroAccess botnet
by flooding routing advertisements that overwhelmed
bot routing tables with invalid or sinkhole entries, iso-
lating bots from each other and crippling the botnet
[18].
Some botnets employ multiple solutions for robust-
ness, for example, Conficker uses HTTP-based C&C in
addition to its P2P protocol [15]. More recently botnets
have begun experimenting with esoteric C&C mech-
anisms, including darknets, social media and cloud ser-
vices. The Flashback Trojan retrieved instructions from
a Twitter account [19]. Whitewell Trojan used Face-
book as a rendezvous point to redirect bots to the C&C
server [20]. Trojan.IcoScript used webmail services like
Yahoo Mail for C&C communications [21]. Makadocs
Trojan [22] and Vernot [23] used Google Docs and Ev-
ernote respectively as proxies to the botmaster. The re-
sults have been mixed. Network administrators rarely
block these services because they are ubiquitously used,
and C&C traffic is therefore hard to distinguish. On the
other hand, C&C channels are again centralized and
companies like Twitter and Google are quick to crack
down on them.
2.2 Bitcoin
Bitcoin may be visualized as a distributed database
which tracks the ownership of virtual currency units
(bitcoins). Bitcoins are not linked to users or accounts
but to addresses. A Bitcoin address is simply a trans-
formation on a public-key, whereas, the private-key is
used to spend the bitcoins associated with that address.
A transaction is a statement containing an input ad-
dress, an output address, and the quantity to be trans-
ferred, digitally signed using the private-key associated
with the input. More complex transactions may include
multiple inputs and outputs. All inputs and outputs are
created using scripts that define the conditions to claim
the bitcoins.
Transactions are circulated over the Bitcoin net-
work, a decentralized global P2P network. Users known
as miners collect transactions and craft them into blocks,
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which are chained into a blockchain to maintain a cryp-
tographically verifiable ordering of transactions. Miners
compete to solve a proof-of-work puzzle to insert their
block into the blockchain. New blocks are generated
at the rate of approximately once every ten minutes.
The double spending problem of digital currencies is
overcome by replicating the blockchain at the network
nodes and using a consensus protocol to ensure global
consistency of state.
Bitcoin was deliberately designed to resist the kind
of centralization, monetary control, and oversight which
restrict fiat currencies [10]. Users have some degree of
anonymity3 which may be enhanced using Tor and mix-
ing services. The decentralized nature of the network
and the proof-of-work puzzle ensures that transactions
in the network cannot be easily regulated. Bitcoin can
only be subverted if a malicious party in the network
musters more computing power than the rest of the
network combined.
Entrepreneurs and researchers have been quick to
recognize Bitcoin as a new paradigm with wide appli-
cation. Projects like Mastercoin [24], Colored Coins [25]
and Counterparty [26] use the Bitcoin network as an un-
derlying primitive to track ‘virtual tokens’ which denote
financial instruments such as bonds and stocks, corpo-
rate currencies such as coupons and tickets, and even
digital properties like subscription services or software
licenses.
Namecoin [27], the first official fork of Bitcoin, en-
ables users to register domains in the Namecoin blockchain
as an alternative DNS outside of ICANN jurisdiction.
Applications towards timestamping have also evolved:
Commitcoin [28] is a research effort that embeds ‘com-
mitments’ to data in the blockchain, effectively times-
tamping it. Similarly, Monegraph provides a proof-of-
ownership service for digital artworks [29]. The One-
Name service [30] allows users to publicly link their
names and Bitcoin addresses by inserting the corre-
sponding details in the Namecoin blockchain.
3 ZombieCoin
Our work is the first to leverage the Bitcoin network
to enable C&C communications for botnets. As we will
demonstrate in the course of this paper, this new facility
offers botmasters significant advantages over traditional
C&C channels. Here we briefly outline the operation of
ZombieCoin:
1) The botmaster generates a set of Bitcoin cre-
dentials, i.e. a key pair (sk, pk). The public-key, pk, is
3 Bitcoin technically provides pseudonymity, a weaker form
of anonymity, in that Bitcoin addresses are not tied to identity
and it is trivial to generate new addresses.
hardcoded into the bot binary file prior to deployment,
so that bots can authenticate communication from the
botmaster. Bots are also equipped with an instruction
set to decode commands send by the botmaster. Our
implementation, described in Section 4, consists of sim-
ple instructions such as REGISTER, PING, UPDATE,
etc. with associated parameters.
2) The botnet is then released into the wild. We as-
sume there is an infection mechanism to propagate the
botnet. One common example nowadays is for botmas-
ters to embed advertisements on webpages frequented
by intended victims. When a viewer clicks on the link,
he is redirected to a website hosting malicious code
which executes in the background and infects his ma-
chine without his knowledge.
Upon infection, each bot generates a unique bot
identifier. This may be done in various ways. For in-
stance, Torpig bots derive an 8 byte identifier (nid) by
hashing the victim’s hard disk volume and serial num-
ber information [16]. Unique identifiers enable the bot-
master to enumerate the botnet, and, as we will demon-
strate later, exercise dynamic fine-grained control over
the bots.
3) Bots then individually connect to the Bitcoin net-
work and receive and propagate incoming Bitcoin trans-
actions. All network communication for the botnet then
proceeds as per the standard Bitcoin protocol specifi-
cation described in [31]. By adhering to the standard
protocol, the network behavior of the bots to an out-
side observer is indistinguishable from the traffic of a
genuine Bitcoin user.
4) The botmaster periodically issues C&C instruc-
tions by obfuscating and embedding them into transac-
tions. Bots identify these transactions by scanning the
ScriptSig field in the transaction input which contains
the botmaster’s public-key, pk, and the digital signa-
ture (computed over the transaction) using private-key
sk. Bots verify the signature, decode the instructions
and execute them accordingly. These instructions may
include commands to not only spy on the victim and
steal his personal information, but also to undertake
external attacks, such as send spam emails and launch
DoS attacks on specified targets.
Next we detail various strategies to embed C&C
commands in transactions.
3.1 Inserting C&C Instructions in Transactions
The most straightforward method is to insert C&C data
in the OP RETURN output script function. The
OP RETURN function is a recent feature included in
the 0.11.0 release of the Bitcoin Core client and allows
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users to insert up to 80 bytes of data in transactions.
However, a transaction may only have one OP RETURN
script.
This inclusion is due to immense lobbying by the
Bitcoin community [32]. Developers anticipate the us-
age of this function to be along the lines of meaningful
transaction identifiers (similar to text fields in online
banking transactions), hash digests of some data such
as contracts [33], cryptotokens, or even index values to
link to other data stores. Analysis of a recent 80-block
portion of the blockchain reveals that the OP RETURN
field was used in about a quarter of transactions in that
portion, indicating that this feature is proving popular
[34]. One company has already launched timestamping
services which rely on embedding hash data in this field
[34].
This bandwidth is more than sufficient to embed
most botnet commands which are typically instruction
sets in the format < command >< parameter > ... <
parameter >. For instance, the DDoS attack library
for Agobot [13] contains commands: ddos.synflood <
host >< time >< delay >< port > and ddos.httpflood <
url >< number >< referrer >< delay >< recursive >,
etc. Agobot has over ninety such commands and they
can be encoded numerically using efficient schemes like
Huffman coding to fit within the 80 byte limit.
A second approach offering greater bandwidth pos-
sibilities is to embed C&C instructions as unspend-
able outputs. Prior to release of the OP RETURN
function, this was the common method by which users
inserted custom data into transactions, and is used by
Counterparty [26] and Mastercoin [24]. We dissect a
typical Mastercoin transaction in Fig. 1. The first out-
put address, 1EXoDusjG..., referred to as the Master-
coin Exodus Address, identifies this as a Mastercoin
transaction. The last output address is an unspendable
output, which decodes into a Mastercoin transaction.
Very small bitcoin values are generally associated with
such outputs because they cannot be redeemed. Up to
20 bytes of data may be inserted into an unspendable
output, and a single transaction may have multiple such
outputs. Proof of Existence [35], a Bitcoin-based notary
public service, timestamps data by inserting hash di-
gests as multiple unspendable outputs in transactions.
Incidentally, however, Mastercoin, Counterparty, and
Proof of Existence have expressed intent to switch to
the OP RETURN function [32]. As we noted, unspend-
able outputs are inherently wasteful. This method is
also clumsy: Bitcoin clients maintain a live inventory of
unspent transaction outputs (UTXO) to efficiently ver-
ify validity of new transactions. Clients cannot identify
malformed outputs, with the result that these addresses
populate the UTXO data set indefinitely (since they are
 
  
{ inputs: [ { address: '1LQBddrjjUaMLHcd4cG9XnN4cCZbHfREJF' , value: 1445759 } ], 
  outputs: [ { address: '1EXoDusjGwvnjZUyKkxZ4UHEf77z6A5S4P', value: 6000 }, 
  { address: '12ARS3euPbdQ9S68xXhmq4ySzSADfMaR1a', value: 6000 } 
                     { address: '1D3tBJ6b3htSaMhEV3EtTAPLvTHwLBrQPH', value: 1417759 }, 
                     { address: ' ', value: 6000 }  ] } 
0b 00000000 00000001 000000004042cd1d000000 
0b – transaction sequence number 
00000000 – transaction type (regular send) 
00000001 – currency ID (Mastercoin) 
000000004042cd1d – value – converting hex to decimal (1078119709) 
Bitcoin Transaction 
Mastercoin Transaction 
Fig. 1 Decoding a Mastercoin transaction [36]
never spent), affecting the efficiency of the network as
a whole.
A more elegant technique is to communicate C&C
messages by key leakage. Signing two different mes-
sages using the same random factor in the ECDSA
signature algorithm allows an observer to derive the
signer’s private-key d. Such instances have already been
observed in the blockchain, resulting in coin theft [37].
In this case, the botmaster frames the C&C instruc-
tion within a 32 byte ECDSA private-key (including
padding with random data so that identical commands
do not always yield the same private-key). This is fol-
lowed by an obfuscation technique to give the data
enough randomness to function as a private-key. The
public-key is then derived.
The botmaster then signs two transactions using the
same random factor k, which will derive two signatures
(r, s1) and (r, s2). Clearly any observer (including our
bots) can detect this C&C message as r appears twice
which also allows them to derive the random factor’s
private key, k (as outlined in [38]). Once k is known, it
is then a trivial operation to derive the private signing
key d and allow the bot to read the command. Notably
this approach has also been used by Commitcoin [28] to
insert hash digests in transactions. Bitcoins need not be
wasted using this method (if the botmaster fully spends
the bitcoins linked to the private key), and bandwidth
is up to 32 bytes per input. However, two transactions
are needed to transmit the C&C instructions.
A more covert solution is to use subliminal chan-
nels. Simmons [39] [40] notably demonstrated that two
parties can set up a secret communications channel in
digital signature schemes. This is again done by exploit-
ing the random factor used by the signing algorithm.
The botmaster creates a C&C instruction bitstring of
length x bits. He then repeatedly generates signatures
on the transaction using different random factors, un-
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til he gets a match, i.e. a signature, the first x bits
of which match the target bitstring. He attaches this
signature to the transaction and publishes it. Nodes re-
ceive the transaction, verify that the signature is valid,
and propagate it. Bots, on the other hand, extract the
instructions from the first x bits and execute them.
Bandwidth is very restricted using this technique
due to the one-way nature of the signing function. Gen-
erating x bits of an ECDSA signature to match a bit-
string takes on average 2x iterations. For larger instruc-
tions, the botmaster may choose to split the instruction
into smaller target bitstrings inserted in multiple signa-
tures. We briefly investigate here the practicality of this
approach. We use an Intel i7 machine operating at 2.8
GHz with 8GB RAM, running 64-bit Windows 7, and
we use the OpenSSL toolkit to construct ECDSA sig-
natures with subliminal channels of incrementing size.
In each run we construct eight signatures matching a
target string and record the time taken. Results are
plotted in Fig. 2.
As demonstrated, it takes under 10 minutes (600s)
to sequentially generate eight signatures with sublim-
inal channels of size 14 bits each. Total bandwidth in
this case is 8 · 14 bits (14 bytes). We consider here a
couple of optimizations: first, we use multithreading to
parallelize operations across the multiple processors of
the machine. It now takes about 3 minutes to gener-
ate eight signatures with 14-bit channels, a reduction
of nearly 65%.
Second, instead of passing each thread a single tar-
get bitstring, we let each thread search across the whole
range of the target bitstrings. The process stops as soon
as each individual thread has located at least one dis-
tinct target. This shared-search step exploits the ran-
domness of the signature generation process, increasing
the odds of a successful match. We note an approxi-
mate 20% improvement over the basic multithreading
scenario. It now takes approximately only 2 minutes to
generate eight 14-bit subliminal channels, which is very
practical. The botmaster can order the resulting sig-
natures accordingly in the transaction to construct the
complete subliminal channel.
We have considered here four methods to insert C&C
instructions into the blockchain, i.e. in the OP RETURN
function, as unspendable outputs, via key leakage, and
by creating subliminal channels. The botmaster can
pick the technique of his choice or even combine dif-
ferent methods as per his requirements. While these
channels are sufficient for typical botnet communica-
tions, they are however restricted in that they provide
low bandwidth of only a few tens of bytes per transac-
tion in the downstream direction (i.e. from botmaster to
bots) only. However, occasionally the botmaster’s com-
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Fig. 2 Bandwidth vs. signature generation time for sublimi-
nal channels
munication requirements may exceed these limitations.
We discuss next some novel proposals to expand the
C&C communication channel.
3.2 Extending ZombieCoin
In this section, we describe enhancements to ZombieCoin
to enable upstream C&C communication, delivery of
larger payloads, and efficient fine-grained botnet parti-
tioning.
Upstream Communication: Botnets require an
upstream channel to send status updates and loot back
to the botmaster. On successful infection, the bot usu-
ally sends a registration message (including bot identi-
fier, machine specifications and geolocation data, etc.)
and periodic heartbeat messages. Loot consists of vic-
tim’s login credentials, financial data or proprietary in-
formation. It would be prohibitively expensive and im-
practical for bots to communicate upstream by embed-
ding information in Bitcoin transactions. However, the
botmaster may use the downstream channel to periodi-
cally announce rendezvous points where bots can direct
upstream communications. For instance, this could be
the web address of a domain owned by the botmaster.
Similar approaches have been observed in the wild.
For instance, botmasters used a Facebook Wall feed to
redirect Whitewell Trojan bots to C&C servers [20].
This is similar to using a domain generation algorithm
but with one key difference: DGAs have been reverse en-
gineered by researchers to lockdown rendezvous points
ahead of time. Some botnets adapted by seeding DGAs
with unpredictable input (such as current Twitter search
trends [16]), which improves the situation a bit, but the
botmaster still has to act within a very narrow time
window to register domains.
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In our scenario though, since the Bitcoin network
acts as a near real-time broadcast channel to the bots,
the botmaster can announce rendezvous points as often
as he wants, and bots can start sending upstream mes-
sages right away. Typically the botmaster has a load-
balancing solution deployed on servers at his end to
cope with the large amount of incoming bot traffic (or it
would amount to a virtual self-DDoS). To better cope,
he could provide bots with multiple web addresses. Bots
could even be programmed to fire a randomized timer
before initiating communication.
The botmaster has considerable flexibility in this
scenario. It will take time for law enforcement to neu-
tralize his servers (depending on geographical location,
ISP regulatory processes, etc.). This critical window,
even if it is a few tens of minutes, may be sufficient.
And if his server is shut down, the C&C channel over
the Bitcoin network is still active, and the botmaster is
free to try again by announcing new rendezvous points.
There is a further advantage: if bots encrypt the
payload with the botmaster’s public-key, they could
upload the data to public locations where the botmas-
ter could easily retrieve it. This may include services
that host user-generated content such as blogging plat-
forms like Tumbler or WordPress and cloud storage
such as Dropbox, OneDrive and text-sharing services
like Pastebin. These options offer less risk for the bot-
master; he does not have to maintain his own servers
or deploy load-balancing and location-masking services.
Bot payload data is encrypted in case law enforcement
confiscates it (however, the data may leak secondary in-
formation which may aid in enumerating the size of the
botnet or the location of the bots). There is already a
rich literature on building censorship-resistant commu-
nication channels on the Internet using social networks
and public sites in a way that takedown is very hard
[41] [42] [43].
Larger Payloads: As we noted earlier, the bot-
master may insert multiple inputs and outputs in a
transaction for greater bandwidth. An alternative for
larger messages is transaction chaining. The botmas-
ter splits the C&C instruction over several transactions
where the output of one is the input of the next and so
on. Bots receive the transactions, order them by exam-
ining the input and output fields to reconstruct the pay-
load. We employ this technique in our proof of concept
implementation, described in Section 4, to transmit 256
byte RSA public-keys to the bots. For large payloads
(in the order of tens of kilobytes or more) such as soft-
ware updates, the botmaster can announce rendezvous
points where bots may download the data.
Partitioning Botnets: Botmasters commonly mon-
etize their activities by partitioning botnets and leasing
them as “botnets for hire” (a typical advertisement in
underground markets cites a price of US $2000 for 2000
bots “consistently online for 40% of the time” [44]).
Partitioning botnets also enables multitasking and is a
good damage control strategy in case part of the net-
work is compromised. The P2P Zeus botnet had over
200,000 bots, distributed into sub-botnets, by hardcod-
ing bots with sub-botnet identifiers prior to deployment
[45]. The Storm botnet assigned unique encryption keys
to bots to distribute them into sub-botnets [46].
This simple approach to partitioning the network
does not permit much flexibility. Ideally the botmaster
should be able to partition botnets dynamically using
parameters such as size, geographical location, machine
specification, etc. In such a scenario, more powerful
machines may be assigned to mining cryptocurrencies
whereas machines with large disk space could be used
to store loot. Machines in the same time zone could
be used to coordinate DDoS attacks. Bots in countries
with lax law enforcement may be used for spam. We
present here an intuitive and elegant solution allowing
fine-grained control over the botnet.
Upon successful infection, bots send a registration
message to the botmaster, communicating their unique
bot identifier and important information about the vic-
tim machine such as machine specification, operating
system, organization, etc. The botmaster maintains a
database of this information and can periodically di-
rect queries at it4. Sample queries may be as follows:
What are the identifiers of all bots in the UK? or What
are the identifiers of 1000 bots running Mac OS X?.
To direct an instruction to these particular bots, the
botmaster inserts the returned identifiers into a Bloom
filter and transmits the result along with the instruc-
tion by embedding the data in a Bitcoin transaction.
ZombieCoin bots receive the filter result and use their
identifiers to check if they are included in the set. If so,
they execute the instructions. This step essentially con-
verts the broadcast communication mode of the Bitcoin
network to a multicast/anycast mode.
A Bloom filter is a space-efficient randomized data
structure used to test for set membership [48]. The
probability for a bot identifier that is not in the origi-
nal set to result in a positive match is referred to as the
Bloom filter’s false positive rate, and is calculated as:
Pf = (1− (1− 1/m)kn)k ≈ (1− e−kn/m)k (1)
where m is the size of the Bloom filter in bits, n is
the number of members in the set, and k is the number
of hash functions used. Minimizing Pf w.r.t k indicates
4 C&C servers belonging to the Zeus botnet were discov-
ered to maintain a similar MySQL database with a web-based
administrative GUI for botmasters [47].
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Fig. 3 False positive rate vs. number of bits per member in
the Bloom filter
that Pf is minimum when k = (ln2) ·m/n. We plot in
Fig. 3, the false positive rate for the ratio m/n, i.e. the
number of bits per member.
The botmaster can now compute optimal filter pa-
rameters: to create a partition of 1000 bots with a false
positive rate of less than 1% (10 bots), he will need
a Bloom filter of size 10 · 1000 bits, i.e. approximately
1.2kB. For 0.5% (5 bots), this would amount to 1.5kB.
The result could easily be transmitted by transaction
chaining or uploading the data to a rendezvous point.
4 Proof of Concept
To validate ZombieCoin, we build a 14 node botnet and
evaluate its performance over the Bitcoin network. We
use the BitcoinJ library [49], which is an open source
Java implementation of the Bitcoin protocol. We chose
the Simplified Payment Verification (SPV) mode [50],
which has a considerably low memory and traffic foot-
print, ideally suited for botnets. As opposed to Core
nodes, SPV nodes do not replicate the entire blockchain
but only a subset of block headers and filter incoming
traffic to transactions of interest. Our bot application is
7MB in size and the locally stored blockchain content
is maintained at 626kB. Furthermore, at the network
level, the bot’s traffic is indistinguishable from that of
any other legitimate Bitcoin SPV client.
To simulate a distributed presence, we installed our
bots in multiple locations in the United States, Europe,
Brazil, and East Asia using Microsoft’s Azure cloud
platform [51], and ran two bots locally in our Comput-
ing Science Department. The bots individually connect
to the Bitcoin network, download peer lists, and scan
for transactions and by the botmaster (us).
Our experiment loops approximately once per hour
through an automated cycle of rudimentary instruc-
 From                                  Command                                   To 
PING 
< 1 >  < website >  < number of pings > 
Botmaster instructs bots to ping a website a certain number of times 
Tenant 
Botmaster 
Botmaster 
Botmaster 
Tenant 
Tenant 
REGISTER 
< 2 > < webserver address > 
Botmaster instructs bots to send registration messages to a webserver  
RENT 
< 3 > < block height > < Tenant Bitcoin address > 
Botmaster rents botnet to a Tenant 
DOWNLOAD 
< 4 > < number of transactions > 
Tenant instructs bots to download data from specified number of transactions 
SCREENSHOT 
 < 5 > < webserver address >  < number of screenshots >  < delay > 
Tenant instructs bots to capture screenshots and upload them to a webserver 
Botnet 
Botnet 
Botnet 
Botnet 
Botnet 
Fig. 4 Sequence of commands in the experiment
tions in the sequence depicted in Fig. 4. We embed C&C
instructions in the OP RETURN field and in (3-bit)
subliminal channels in the outputs. Bots are hardcoded
with a public-key, enabling them to identify our trans-
actions. Bots receive transactions, verify, decode, and
execute them.
We simulate botnet leasing in Step 3 in Fig. 4. Bot-
master and tenant sign and publish a multi-input trans-
action containing the RENT command. Bots verify the
input signatures, record the tenant’s public-key, and ac-
cept C&C instructions issued by the tenant for the du-
ration of the lease period. The RENT transaction is a
bona fide contract between botmaster and tenant and
includes the lease payment in bitcoins from the tenant
to botmaster.
When the tenant assumes control, he may send bots
new encryption credentials or software modules. We
simulate this with the DOWNLOAD command which
uses transaction chaining to send bots a 256 byte RSA
public-key, split over 7 back-to-back transactions. When
bots receive the SCREENSHOT command, they cap-
ture a snapshot of the victim’s desktop, encrypt it us-
ing the tenant’s RSA public-key and send it to the web
address specified.
We collect over 2300 responses from our bots over a
24 hour period.5 We are interested in the C&C channel
latency and in the time it takes for bots to respond
to an instruction. We define a bot’s response time
as the time period from when the botmaster issues an
5 The C&C transactions pertaining to our experiment
can be identified in the blockchain by transaction input
1LujiuygToEddPEmRGMQUGXbsMGmup1Wrs. The initial
‘ping’ command is recorded in Block 319998 (transaction ID:
b26b3ea0d8065d3288a5142580a5f0e372445d27bb51b45a491d2e5f20238c5e).
The final ‘screenshot’ command oc-
curs in Block 320153 (transaction ID:
326e06b6c187c5d97ad783fc4d7bd67cf9c80894cd9837d5e83b04ce0f0f4068).
Commands can be decoded by setting the offset for each
ASCII character to -125.
ZombieCoin 2.0: Managing Next-Generation Botnets using Bitcoin 9
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Bot response time t (s)
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
 t
h
a
t 
b
o
t 
re
s
p
o
n
s
e
 t
im
e
 <
 t
Fig. 5 Cumulative probability distribution of bot response
time
instruction and it is successfully received by the bot
over the Bitcoin network. To synchronize readings over
multiple time zones, we configure bots to set their clocks
using a common timeserver.
All bots successfully received the botmaster’s in-
structions. Fig. 5 plots the cumulative probability dis-
tribution of the bot response time. Due to the connec-
tivity of the Bitcoin P2P network, about 50% of the
time, the bots responded within 5 seconds, and 90% of
the time within 10 seconds. The median response time
is 5.54 seconds. In the interest of improved visualiza-
tion, our results do not show outliers beyond the 100
second mark. Only in 15 instances (0.6% of the overall
communications) was bot response time greater, rang-
ing from 100-260s.
4.1 Discussion
To summarize thus far: ZombieCoin inherits the key
strengths of the Bitcoin network, namely low-latency
communication, consistent network state, and a dis-
tributed decentralized architecture. The botmaster need
not maintain his own C&C infrastructure, which is a
risky and costly endeavor. Bots can be maintained in
isolation from each other. C&C traffic over the local
network is indistinguishable from that of legitimate Bit-
coin users. Upstream channels can be conveniently es-
tablished and Bloom filters enable fine-grained control
over the botnet. We believe our experimental results,
together with the relative ease of implementation us-
ing freely available software, highlight the realistic and
practical aspects of ZombieCoin and we should take se-
riously the threat of botnets upgrading C&C commu-
nications onto the Bitcoin network.
So far we have assumed bots identify messages from
the botmaster based on transaction input which raises
the possibility of blacklisting the botmaster’s Bitcoin
address. This is not likely to resolve the problem. For
one, it would be a form of regulation, a fundamental
violation of the Bitcoin ethos [10], and we expect Bit-
coin users would be the first to vigorously resist such
attempts.
Second, such a step would require a significant pro-
tocol upgrade which could potentially degrade perfor-
mance and usability of Bitcoin for legitimate users. Min-
ers by themselves could, with relative ease, cooperate
and ensure ZombieCoin transactions do not appear in
the blockchain. However, this does not solve the under-
lying problem of the circulation of ZombieCoin trans-
actions throughout the network. In the current Bitcoin
protocol version, nodes that receive incoming transac-
tions perform checks for correctness (i.e. the input ad-
dress is valid, the transaction is in the correct format,
sum of inputs equals outputs, the digital signature is
verified, etc.) and then forward the transaction on to
other nodes. Valid transactions are forwarded to all
nodes, irrespective of the number of nodes in the net-
work.
In our implementation described earlier, our bots
do not look up transactions from incoming blocks of
the blockchain (at approximate 10 minute intervals),
but instead receive them within a 5-12 second window
as the transactions propagate throughout the network.
Therefore, even if all C&C transactions are ultimately
rejected by miners, the bots have already received them,
validated them, and carried out the embedded instruc-
tions. Halting the propagation of these transactions in
the Bitcoin network would require the explicit cooper-
ation of the majority of nodes in the network, neces-
sitating not just protocol modifications, but network-
wide synchronization of nodes against a blacklist that
all parties agree upon.
Furthermore, to defeat any censorship measures the
botmaster can switch to alternate authentication strate-
gies which do not rely solely on Bitcoin addresses but
may use subliminal channels in transaction outputs or
digital signatures. Botmasters could potentially keep
switching authentication strategies, thereby escalating
the fight and making it harder for legitimate clients to
use the network.
In theory, an anti-virus installed on a victim’s ma-
chine could scan the Bitcoin network in lockstep with
bots and block incoming C&C instructions. However,
new malware are adept at evading anti-viruses: Torpig
bots [16] contain rootkit functionality, executing their
code prior to loading the OS, or injecting their code into
legitimate processes to escape detection. Others like Ze-
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roAccess contain tripwire mechanisms which suspend
anti-virus scanning activity [18].
We would also make mention here of the costs of
running ZombieCoin. At the time of our experiments,
it cost us about 3 cents (0.1mBTC) for every 1000
bytes of data in the transaction. Our experiment ran
over 24 hours and 250 C&C instructions were sent at a
cost of US$ 7.50. We also note that since transactions
are flooded to the entire Bitcoin network, the transac-
tion fees would have remained constant regardless of
the number of bots we deployed. These costs are there-
fore trivial compared to the profits made by successful
botnets which are typically in the hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars. Furthermore, Bitcoin-based C&C is
also a considerably safer option compared to existing
botnets where the odds of detection, botnet takedown,
and identification of the botmaster are dramatically
higher.
5 Recommendations
Thus far we have found little recognition of this threat
among the Bitcoin community.6 However, there has been
some attempt made at raising awareness within the bot-
net and hacker communities. Interpol researchers at the
BlackHat Asia conference recently demonstrated a mal-
ware which downloads specific coded strings from the
Bitcoin blockchain (where they are stored as transac-
tion outputs) and stitches them together into one com-
mand and executes it. Forbes magazine profiled this
threat and others (including a preliminary version of
ZombieCoin [53]), dubbing this phenomenon blockchain
“pollution”, and concluded on the somber note that
there are as yet no easy solutions to this problem [54].
Perhaps we need to shift research focus back to traf-
fic analysis and malware detection techniques. The new
paradigm of software-defined networking (SDN) may
hold some promise: there is already research suggesting
SDN assists significantly in detecting malware-related
anomalies at the network level [55].
We would stress here an earlier suggestion from the
literature [16]: researchers and law enforcement should
cultivate working relationships with registrars and ISPs
to enable rapid response time to malware threats. If a
botmaster announces rendezvous points over the Bit-
coin network, registrars scattered over the world may
6 The Namecoin lead developer was interviewed in 2014 on
the possibility of Namecoin being used to empower botnets.
His response, “Is there a real benefit for the zombie computer to
use this instead of connecting to an IRC channel or else? Updat-
able IP? It may be less complex to get IP from hacked computers
all over the world or to build a P2P botnet. As each thing that
provides power to its user, it can be used in a bad or good way
(as knives, secure communication software, etc).” [52].
need to block sites at very short notice. Incidentally,
third party DNS services (such as OpenDNS, or Google
Public DNS) and cloud-based security solutions (like
Umbrella) may actually prove agile enough for this pur-
pose [56].
Another approach proposed before, but, to the best
of our knowledge, never applied in practice is to combat
the botnet problem at its root, the economy that drives
it. Ford et al. propose [57] deliberately infecting large
numbers of decoy virtual machines (honeypots) to join
the botnet but remain under control of the white hats.
By disruptive, unpredictable behavior, these sybils will
actively undermine the economic relationship between
the botmaster and clients. An ad master for instance,
may pay for a certain number of ad impressions, and
the machines may make artificial clicks but this will not
translate to a corresponding increase in actual sales.
Targeting the economic incentive may prove a potent
counter to the botnet threat.
6 Prior Work
Botnet-related research follows multiple strands. There
are studies on the botnet economy [58] [57] [59]. Re-
searchers have autopsied botnets, including early vari-
eties like Agobot, SDbot [13], and state-of-the-art worms,
Conficker [60], Storm [61], Waladec [62], and ZeroAc-
cess [45]. There is extensive work on botnet tracking
methods [63] [64] and traffic analysis and detection tools
such as BotSniffer [65], BotMiner [66], and BotHunter
[67]. Researchers have infiltrated botnets [16] and doc-
umented insider perspectives [68]. Readers interested in
comprehensive surveys of the botnet phenomenon are
directed to [69] [70].
There is a growing literature on exploring novel C&C
mechanisms so that preemptive solutions may be de-
vised. We summarize here a few such efforts:
Lee et al. [71] and Szabo et al. [72] propose auto-
mated botnets that derive instructions from pervasive
Internet information (e.g. stock market figures or major
news events). This data cannot be easily manipulated
and C&C traffic blends in with legitimate user traffic.
Such botnets are uncontrolled and unpredictable. This
may not make economic sense, but hearkens back to
earlier days when botnets were mostly built to enhance
standing in the hacker community.
Starnberg et al. present Overbot [73] which uses the
P2P protocol Kademlia for stealth C&C communica-
tions. The authors share our design concerns that bot
traffic is covert and not easily distinguishable. However,
there are critical differences: Overbot nodes carry the
private key of the botmaster, and capturing one bot
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compromises the entire botnet’s communications. Fur-
thermore, unlike our case where instructions are circu-
lated within seconds, for Overbot this may take up to
12 hours. ZombieCoin also requires substantially less
network management as the Bitcoin network handles
message routing and global consistency.
The work closest to ours is that of Nappa et al. [74]
who propose a C&C channel overlaid on the Skype net-
work. Skype is closed-source, has a large user base, is
resilient to failure, enforces default encryption, and is
notoriously difficult to reverse engineer, all of which are
ideal qualities for C&C communications. As in our case,
disrupting this botnet would significantly impact legit-
imate Skype users. However, unlike Bitcoin, Skype is
not designed to maintain low latency global consistency
of state. Furthermore, after the Microsoft takeover in
2011, Skype has switched to a centralized cloud-based
architecture [75].
Researchers have also proposed novel C&C mecha-
nisms: Stegobot [76] creates subliminal channels on so-
cial networks by steganographic manipulation of user-
shared images. Zeng et al. [77] describe a mobile P2P
botnet concealing C&C communication in SMS spam
messages. Desimone et al. [78] suggest creating covert
channels in BitTorrent protocol messages. These solu-
tions present interesting possibilities but are not very
practical, with limitations in terms of bandwidth, la-
tency and security.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have described ZombieCoin, a mecha-
nism to control botnets using Bitcoin. ZombieCoin in-
herits key strengths of the Bitcoin network, namely it
is distributed, has low latency, and it would be hard to
censor C&C instructions inserted in transactions with-
out significantly impacting legitimate Bitcoin users. Zom-
bieCoin has a key advantage over current botnet C&C
mechanisms in that common takedown techniques of
confiscating suspect web domains, seizing C&C servers
or poisoning P2P networks, would not be effective. Fur-
thermore, ZombieCoin enables novel and powerful C&C
communication modes, allowing botmasters to easily
set up upstream channels, expand bandwidth, efficiently
partition botnets, and exercise fine-grained control over
individual bots. Our prototype implementation demon-
strates that it is easy to implement this C&C function-
ality by modifying freely available software, and experi-
mental results show that instructions propagate in near
real-time on the Bitcoin network.
We believe ZombieCoin poses a credible emergent
threat and we hope our work prompts further discus-
sion and proves a step towards devising effective coun-
termeasures.
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